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Pari Passu as a Weapon and the Changes to 
Sovereign Debt Boilerplate after Argentina 
v. NML     
David Newfield* 
The pari passu clause is found in nearly every sovereign debt 
contract issued throughout the globe. In the private context, this 
clause is well understood to ensure fair distributions to all 
creditors in the event of bankruptcy and liquidation.  As 
insolvency distributions are not an option when dealing with 
distressed sovereign debt, the rights and duties associated with 
this clause have been subject to extensive litigation for over 20 
years. 
Starting from the case of Elliot v. Peru, in the early 1990s, and 
more recently in Argentina v. NML, courts have interpreting 
these bonds, governed subject to New York law, in favor of 
holdout creditors. By means of a novel interpretation of the 
clause, vulture funds have gained a legal “weapon” with which 
they can force a sovereign nation into default if they are not paid 
in full. As a result, sovereign debtors have rapidly begun to 
adapt the pari passu clause in their new debt contracts to negate 
the adverse position of the courts. This leads to the questions of 
why these contracts have been so slow to adapt and what 
catalyst has been the impetus of change in recent years. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
What happens when a country can no longer meet its debt 
obligations? For individuals, corporations, and municipalities, when a 
person or entity cannot repay its debts, bankruptcy may be the next step.1 
Bankruptcy allows the debtor either to liquidate, by surrendering its 
assets to creditors, or to restructure the debt.2 Even if an individual does 
not file for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy laws governing liquidation and 
reorganization will provide the legal backdrop against which an out-of-
court workout may be reached.3 Creditors who might otherwise oppose a 
debt restructuring may ultimately consent, knowing that a court could 
force a restructuring over their objections.4  For a sovereign, however, 
there is no bankruptcy option.5 There are no procedures for liquidating a 
                                                                                                             
1 See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2014). 
2 UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/Bank
ruptcyBasics/Process.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2015); see also 11 U.S.C. (2010). 
Chapter 7 provides for liquidation of debtor’s assets. Id. Chapter 9 provides for municipal 
reorganization. Id. Chapter 11 provides for commercial reorganization. Id. Chapter 13 
provides for adjustment of debts to meet a payment plan for a debtor with regular income. 
Id. 
3 See Richard M. Cieri et al., Restructuring bond debt in the global marketplace, 
GIBSON DUNN (2004/05), http://www.gibsondunn.com/fstore/documents/pubs/Restructuri
ng_Bond_Debt.pdf, at 33-34. 
4 Id. at 38-39. 
5 See Nouriel Roubini, Gouging the Gauchos, KITCO (Jul. 01, 2014, 12:18 PM), 
http://www.kitco.com/ind/Roubini/2014-07-01-Gouging-the-Gauchos.html?sitetype=fulls
ite#.U7PcQuFRKrg.email [hereinafter Roubini]. In 2002, the IMF proposed a framework 
for a sovereign bankruptcy court. However, this proposal has been widely considered 
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sovereign, and there is no background set of legal rules under which a 
court may “cram down” a debt restructuring.6 
Without a bankruptcy option, sovereign debt restructuring is 
vulnerable to holdout problems: a minority of creditors may oppose the 
terms of a restructuring in order to extract a greater dividend from the 
sovereign.7 In order to aid the process of sovereign debt workouts and the 
restructuring of debt, “boilerplate”8 language has developed in sovereign 
debt contracts.9 While boilerplate language in these contracts serves the 
general function of standard terms, such as to create a consistent 
framework familiar to all market participants, certain clauses have been 
developed specifically to address the holdout problem.10 
An example of such a boilerplate provision is the collective action 
clause (“CAC”).11 The market has gradually shifted from unanimous 
action clauses (“UACs”), which require unanimous creditor approval for 
debtors to amend bond terms, to CACs, which only require a majority, 
usually a supermajority,12 of the other creditors to have accepted the 
debt’s new terms.13 Thus, CACs allow debtors to “cram down on 
holdouts . . . terms accepted by a majority of creditors.”14 
Another notable boilerplate clause found in sovereign debt contracts 
is known as the “pari passu” clause. Pari passu literally means “on equal 
                                                                                                             
politically infeasible. See Jefferey A. Frankel, Comment on “Toward a Statutory 
Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Lessons from Corporate Bankruptcy Practice 
Around the World”, IMF (2003), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2002/00-
00/pdf/Frankel.pdf, at 78. 
6 See Roubini, supra note 5. 
7 See id. 
8 Boilerplate is “[f]ixed or standardized contractual language that the proposing party 
often views as relatively nonnegotiable.” BOILERPLATE, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014). 
9 See Roubini, supra note 5. 
10 Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An 
Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 930-32 (2004); see also 
Roubini, supra note 5. 
11 See Roubini, supra note 5. 
12 Supermajority is “[a] fixed proportion greater than half (often two-thirds or a 
percentage greater than 50%), required for a measure to pass. Such a majority is needed 
for certain extraordinary actions, such as ratifying a constitutional amendment or 
approving a fundamental corporate change.” MAJORITY, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(10th ed. 2014). 
13 See Stephen J. Choi et al., The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1, 13-15 (2013). 
14 Roubini, supra note 5. Note that even CACs are not a perfect way to avoid a holdout 
problem in the future. A cramdown is a concept in bankruptcy law where “despite the 
opposition of certain creditors . . . .a court may confirm a [bankruptcy] plan.” 
CRAMDOWN, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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footing.”15 The purpose of this clause is to obligate the debtor to treat all 
creditors fairly by not favoring one creditor through the subordination of 
another creditor’s debt.16 In the corporate context, this means “those 
whose debts rank pari passu will get paid on an equal priority in the 
event of an insolvency distribution.”17 However, as sovereign nations 
cannot be liquidated, the actual meaning of the pari passu clause in the 
sovereign debt context has been subject to much dispute.18 Originally, 
this clause was thought to protect only the legal “ranking” of a sovereign 
creditor’s claims.19 However, an interpretation requiring “ratable 
payment” to creditors appeared with the introduction of litigation on the 
issue.20 
The first major case that addressed the clause was Elliott v. Peru, a 
case interpreting the meaning of pari passu as governed by New York 
law.21 Elliott Associates L.P., a vulture fund,22 purchased a large amount 
                                                                                                             
15 Mark L.J. Wright, Interpreting the Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Bond Contracts: 
It’s all Hebrew (and Aramaic) to Me, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO (May 4, 
2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=24326711, at 1. 
16 Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt 
Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869, 911-12 (2004). 
17 Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contract as Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 
1134 (2006). 
18 See id. at 1133-34. 
19 Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, IMF (Oct. 2014), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2
014/090214.pdf at 38 [hereinafter IMF]. This is known as the “ranking” interpretation. 
A sovereign could affect the legal ranking of such creditor claims . . . 
by (i) earmarking government revenues or by allocating foreign 
currency reserves to a single creditor, (ii) adopting legal measures 
that would have the effect of preferring one set of creditors over 
others,
 
or (iii) allowing creditors to obtain priority without the 
consent of other creditors. 
Id. 
20 Id. This is known as the “ratable payment” interpretation. Id. Under this broader 
“ratable payment” interpretation, the clause not only protected legal rank, but also 
included a payment obligation that required the sovereign to pay its creditors on a ratable 
basis. While this interpretation would not preclude a sovereign from contracting debts 
with different repayment profiles, the implication was that if the sovereign were unable to 
pay all of its debts in full as they became due and payable, it would need to pay such 
debts on a ratable basis. 
21 See Choi, supra note 17 at 1134; see also Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la 
Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 366 (2d Cir. 1999). 
22 A “vulture fund” is a hedge fund or private equity fund that invests in debt that is 
considered weak and/or in imminent default (otherwise known as “distressed debt”). 
“These plaintiffs are often referred to as ‘vulture funds’ because their strategy is to buy 
sovereign debt instruments when a country is most vulnerable, which enables the funds to 
purchase the debt at a deep discount from its face value and attempt to enforce the full 
claims.” Jonathan I. Blackman & Rahul Mukhi, The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt 
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of distressed Peruvian bank debt, which was guaranteed by Peru’s 
government.23 Elliott refused to participate in the restructuring process 
when the government of Peru could no longer meet its debt obligations, 
and the fund demanded full repayment of its debt.24 Despite Elliot’s 
demands, Peru decided to proceed with repaying its creditors that had 
accepted its new repayment plan.25 Elliott responded by trying to enjoin 
European payment processers from assisting Peru by arguing that the 
pari passu clause prevents debtors from making payments to only some 
creditors at the exclusion of others—the ratable payment interpretation.26 
This case went before the Belgian Court of Appeals, which sided with 
Elliott’s position.27 Before the case proceeded to further litigation, the 
parties settled out of court.28 
A more recent case that addressed the meaning of the pari passu 
clause in the sovereign debt context is Argentina v. NML.29 NML 
Capital,30 also a vulture fund, acquired a small percentage of Argentina’s 
distressed debt, which was governed by New York law.31 Later, when 
Argentina tried to repay its creditors that accepted its restructured debt, 
NML obtained injunctive relief in the Second Circuit prohibiting 
Argentina from repaying 93% of its distressed debt to renegotiated 
bondholders without repaying the remaining 7% to holdout investors 
simultaneously.32 The Court’s adoption of the ratable payment 
interpretation forced Argentina to default on its restructured bonds and 
effectively gave a hedge fund the power to control a country’s ability to 
repay its debts, by preventing the country from repaying its renegotiated 
bondholders until the holdout creditors’ debts were satisfied.33 
                                                                                                             
Litigation: Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna, 73 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS 47, 49 (Fall 2010), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol73/iss4/6/. 
23 Umakanth Varottil, Sovereign Debt Documentation: Unraveling the Pari Passu 
Mystery, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 119, 120 (2008). 
24 See id. 
25 See id. at 121. 
26 See id. at 121-22. 
27 Id. at 122. 
28 Id. 
29 See IMF, supra note 19, at 40-41. 
30 It is interesting to note that NML Capital, the plaintiff in the Argentina litigation, is 
a subsidiary of Elliott Associates, the plaintiff in the Peru litigation. See Africa and Latin 
America Still Fight Vulture Funds, THE WORLD POST (Nov. 12, 2012, 2:46 PM), http://w
ww.huffingtonpost.com/hector-timerman/africa-latin-america-vulture-funds_b_2100827.
html. 
31 See IMF, supra note 19, at 8. 
32 Id. at 8-9. 
33 See Roubini, Supra note 5; see also Jamila Trindle, Argentine Default Bad Test Case 
for Sovereign Debt Negotiations, FOREIGN POLICY (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.foreignpo
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As a reaction to the recent Argentina decision,34 there has been a 
sudden urgency to avoid a similar holdout investor problem in the future 
by rewording the boilerplate language in sovereign debt contracts.35 Both 
the International Capital Markets Association (“ICMA”) and the 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) have been very involved with 
reworking these contracts.36 Besides making changes to the pari passu 
clause, the CACs for new bond contracts have also been reworked.37 
The sudden urgency to change the boilerplate language of sovereign 
debt contracts begs the question: why did the boilerplate language not 
change after Elliott v. Peru in contrast to the rapid change now taking 
place after Argentina v. NML? Phrased differently, boilerplate language 
is known to be “sticky” and is not changed very often.38 By using 
standardized terms, contracting parties are able to lower uncertainty 
levels and reduce contracting costs.39 What then changed that is leading 
to this language being modified so quickly now? 
This Comment argues that after Argentina, the pari passu clause 
became a “weapon” that holdout investors could use. Unlike after Peru, 
holdout investors such as hedge funds, are empowered to, and have, 
forced a sovereign nation to default on its debt after Argentina. In Peru, 
the danger of the Belgian Court’s interpretation of the pari passu clause 
was recognized, but no harm ultimately arose and the decision was 
considered a one-off occurrence. The nature of the Second Circuit’s 
Argentina ruling and the subsequent Argentina default is so extreme that 
it has dictated a market response that differs in severity and speed from 
Peru. Also, unlike the typical slow adoption of new boilerplate terms by 
market participants, a much quicker and broader large-scale adoption 
may be expected. 




34 The Second Circuit issued its decision in October 2012. However, its decision was 
not final until the Supreme Court refused to hear Argentina’s appeal in June 2014. See 
infra p. 16. 
35 See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, A Sensible Step to Mitigate Sovereign Bond Dysfunction, 
PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (Aug. 29, 2014, 4:57 PM), 
http://blogs.piie.com/realtime/?p=4485; see also IMF, supra note 19, at 8-9.After the 
Supreme Court decision came out in June 2014, ICMA and the IMF published proposed 
amendments to the clauses within months—August and October respectively. Id. 
36 See Gelpern, supra note 35; see IMF, supra note 19. 
37 See generally IMF, supra note 19, at 15-30. 
38 Gregory H. Shill, Boilerplate Shock: Sovereign Debt Contracts as Incubators of 
Systemic Risk, 89 TUL. L. REV. 751, 765 (2015). 
39 Choi, supra note 10, at 931. 
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Part II of this Comment describes the nature of sovereign debt 
boilerplate contracts and narrates events, both during and following 
Elliot v. Peru and Argentina v. NML. Parts III and IV of this Comment 
then explain the reasons for the differing market responses, describe 
what type of further litigation of the pari passu clause may arise, and 
briefly examine what to expect should the interpretation of the pari passu 
clause be challenged as a matter of English law. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Nature of Sovereign Debt Boilerplate 
Two types of provisions in sovereign debt contracts are particularly 
important as to the holdout creditor problem—the pari passu clause and 
the collective action clause (“CAC”). The pari passu clause has existed 
as boilerplate language in sovereign debt contracts for nearly two 
centuries.40 This clause arguably empowers creditors by preventing 
debtors from subordinating one creditor’s claim to another creditor’s 
claim.41 CACs are a more recent development designed specifically to 
address the holdout problem by empowering the debtor.42 After bonds 
are issued, parties require a way to restructure debt outside of a 
bankruptcy court.43 Thus, unanimous action clauses (“UACs”) and CACs 
were included in bond contracts to allow parties to amend terms of the 
bond issue.44 UACs require unanimous bondholder approval in order to 
modify principal and interest terms of the contract.45 In contrast, CACs 
serve a similar purpose, but do not require unanimous approval, making 
it easier to reduce the payment terms in sovereign bonds.46 With no other 
way to “cram down” new terms on holdouts of sovereign debt contracts, 
as bankruptcy is not an option, CACs are increasingly employed.47 
Much research on sovereign debt boilerplate has focused on the shift 
from UACs to CACs in sovereign bonds.48 The shift to CACs began in 
late 2000, when Ecuador used a creative interpretation of a UAC clause 
                                                                                                             
40 Benjamin Remy Chabot & Mitu Gulati, Santa Anna and His Black Eagle: The 
Origins of Pari Passu?, 9 CAPITAL MARKETS LAW JOURNAL 1, 1 (Feb. 18, 2014), http://sc
holarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3237/. 
41 See Choi, supra note 17, at 1133-36. 
42 Roubini, supra note 5. 
43 See Choi, supra note 10, at 932. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 See id. 
47 Roubini, supra note 5. 
48 See Choi, supra note 10, at 932. 
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to modify existing bond terms with less than unanimous approval from 
bondholders.49 Ecuador structured an exchange offer where bondholders 
who participated in the exchange automatically voted in favor of a list of 
amendments to the old bonds; thus, making those bonds less attractive to 
holdout investors.50 This restructuring method effectively reduced 
incentives for holdout investors to refrain from participating in the bond 
exchange in the hope that they would be able to negotiate for better terms 
at a later date.51 However, it took three years for the market to shift away 
from existing UAC terms and to begin using modified CACs—only after 
Mexico took the first step by redrafting its consent clauses.52 
Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati, two of the preeminent scholars on the 
nature of boilerplate language in sovereign debt contracts, attributed the 
lack of an immediate shift to new contract terms to the “stickiness 
hypothesis.”53 The standardized nature of sovereign debt contracts has 
been attributed to network externalities.54 No meaningful regulatory body 
exists that interferes with the contracting practices of such contracts.55 
Further, such contracts involve hundreds of millions of dollars and are 
often traded in the secondary market.56 Thus, adopting standardized 
terms in these contracts helps lower uncertainty levels and reduces 
                                                                                                             
49 Choi, supra note 10, at 933; see also Policy Development and Review and Legal 
Departments, Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises—
Restructuring Internationals Sovereign Bonds, IMF (Jan. 24, 2001), http://www.imf.org/e
xternal/pubs/ft/series/03/IPS.pdf at 7 [hereinafter IMF, Policy Development]. 
 
50 IMF, Policy Development, supra note 49, at 8. The amendment deleted: 
the requirement that all payment defaults must be cured as a 
condition to any rescission of acceleration, the provision that restricts 
Ecuador from purchasing any of the Brady bonds while a payment 
default is continuing, the covenant that prohibits Ecuador from 
seeking a further restructuring of Brady bonds, the cross-default 
clause, the negative pledge covenant, and the covenant to maintain 




52 See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 681 (2006). 
53 Id. 
54 Choi, supra note 10, at 930-31. The discussion of network externalities originated in 
economic theory. Bryan Druzin, Buying Commercial Law: Choice of Law, Choice of 
Forum, and Network Externalities, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 131, 145 (2009). “[T]he 
notion of network externalities . . . has been put forward as a way of explaining the 
ascendancy of particular products over others.” Id. “Positive feedback mechanisms . . . 
reinforce bourgeoning patterns in a particular field, causing these patterns to become 
progressively more entrenched.” Id. at 146. 
55 Choi, supra note 10, at 930. 
56 Id. 
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contracting costs.57 A change in sovereign debt contracts only occurs 
when there is an “interpretive shock.”58 This change is typically not 
immediate, and will usually only take place in small shifts.59 Debtors 
avoid making a large shift due to the uncertainty that the new contract 
terms are any better, and will usually wait for these deviance costs to be 
borne by a “pioneer.”60 
B. Litigation Involving Pari Passu—Two Interpretations 
Recently, much litigation of sovereign debt boilerplate has focused 
on the pari passu clause.61 Numerous scholars have posited various 
theories as to why this clause was first introduced.62 Despite the fact that 
the clause has been found in nearly every single sovereign debt contract 
since its introduction, there is no one accepted understanding as to its 
meaning.63 
A typical pari passu clause is worded as such: “The Notes rank, and 
will rank, pari passu in right of payment with all other present and future 
unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness of the Issuer.”64 
Pari passu roughly translates to “on equal footing.”65 In the case of 
corporate bonds, commentators have widely agreed on the meaning of 
this clause: that in the event of insolvency and liquidation, all holders of 
equally ranked debt will receive an equal share of the proceeds.66 
However, in the sovereign debt context, there is no option of liquidation 
                                                                                                             
57 Id. at 931. 
58 See Choi, supra note 10, at 946. 
59 See id. at 945-46. 
60 Id.; Ben-Shahar, supra note 52, at 681. 
61 IMF, supra note 19, at 38. 
62 See, e.g., Buchheit, supra note 16, at 875. 
These explanations have ranged from a suggestion that drafters may 
have wanted to prevent an informal ‘earmarking’ of a sovereign’s 
assets or revenues to service a particular debt to the more cynical 
explanation that this type of debt had a tendency to migrate—through 
the ignorance or inattention of contract drafters—from cross-border 
corporate debt instruments to sovereign debt instruments. 
Id.; see also Chabot, supra note 40, at 2 (“Santa Anna and his Equal Treatment Decree”); 
see also Wright, supra note 15; see also Mark C. Weidemaier et al., Origins Myths, 
Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari Passu, 38 Law and Soc. Inquiry 72 (Mar. 25, 2011), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1633439. 
63 See Chabot, supra note 40, at 2. 
64 Buchheit, supra note 16, at 871 (emphasis added). 
65 Wright, supra note 14, at 1. 
66 Weidemaier, supra note 52, at 4; see also Choi, supra note 17, at 1134. 
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in the event of insolvency.67 Thus, the actual legal implications of this 
clause under such circumstances are not clearly understood.68 
1. Elliott V. Peru 
“Until the late 1990s, the prevailing view was that the typical pari 
passu clause in sovereign debt agreements protected only the legal 
ranking of a sovereign’s creditors.”69 Before then, this clause was 
thought to prevent the subordination of one creditor’s debt to another 
without the other creditor’s consent.70 For example, in some countries, 
such as Spain and the Philippines, the act of notarizing a debt renders it 
senior to other debts that have not been notarized.71 Thus, the pari passu 
clause prevented such involuntary subordination and provided security to 
creditors in cross-border transactions.72 
However, “in the late 1990s, an alternative interpretation of the pari 
passu clause as requiring ‘ratable payment’ to creditors surfaced in 
litigation against sovereign debtors.”73 This new interpretation of pari 
passu was introduced in a case brought by the investment fund Elliott 
Associates, L.P.74 
Between January and March 1996, Elliott purchased approximately 
$20.7 million of working capital debt of Banco de la Nacion and Banco 
Popular del Peru, a bankrupt Peruvian bank.75 “[A]ll of the debt was 
guaranteed by Peru pursuant to a written guaranty dated May 31, 1983,” 
which was governed by New York law.76 Despite Peru’s attempts to 
restructure this debt, Elliott refused to participate in the restructuring 
process.77 Elliott pursued and obtained judgment in the Southern District 
of New York for over $55 million.78 Despite its win, Elliott faced the 
difficulty of actually collecting the judgment.79 Peru decided to repay the 
                                                                                                             
67 Weidemaier, supra note 52, at 4. 
68 Id. 
69 IMF, supra note 19, at 38. 
 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 37 n. 2. 
72 See id. at 37. 
73 Id. at 38. 
74 ISSUE 79—PARI PASSU CLAUSES, 79 FINANCIAL MARKETS LAW COMMITTEE 1, 8 
(Mar. 2005), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/files/2012/11/fmlc79mar_2005.pdf [hereinafter 
FMLC]. 
75 Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 366-67 (2d Cir. 1999). 
76 Id. at 367. 
77 Varottil, supra note 23, at 120. 
78 Id. at 120-21. 
79 Id. at 121. 
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holders of its restructured Brady Bonds,80 by using the Euroclear System 
in Belgium, and to avoid the payment due to Elliott.81 In September 
2000, Elliott attempted to enforce its judgment by seeking an injunction 
in the Belgian Courts to prevent Euroclear from processing Peru’s 
payment.82 
In an affidavit obtained by Elliott for the purpose of the Peru 
litigation, New York University Professor Andreas Lowenfeld explained 
the pari passu clause as such: 
I have no difficulty in understanding what the pari passu 
clause means: it means what it says—a given debt will 
rank equally with other debt of the borrower, whether 
that borrower is an individual, a company, or a sovereign 
state. A borrower from Tom, Dick, and Harry can’t say 
“I will pay Tom and Dick in full, and if there is anything 
left over I’ll pay Harry.” If there is not enough money to 
go around, the borrower faced with a pari passu 
provision must pay all three of them on the same basis. 
Suppose, for example, the total debt is $50,000 and the 
borrower has only $30,000 available. Tom lent $20,000 
and Dick and Harry lent $15,000 each. The borrower 
must pay three fifths of the amount owed to each one – 
i.e., $12,000 to Tom, and $9,000 each to Dick and 
Harry. Of course the remaining sums would remain as 
obligations of the borrower. But if the borrower 
proposed to pay Tom $20,000 in full satisfaction, Dick 
$10,000 and Harry nothing, a court could and should 
issue an injunction at the behest of Harry. The injunction 
would run in the first instance against the borrower, but I 
believe (putting jurisdictional considerations aside) to 
Tom and Dick as well.83 
                                                                                                             
80 Brady Bonds are named after former U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady. These 
bonds were introduced in the late 1980s to address the Latin Debt Crisis, when a number 
of Latin American countries admitted their inability to service hundreds of billions of 
dollars worth of commercial bank loans. In exchange for the commercial bank loans, the 
countries issued new bonds with more agreeable repayment terms. This plan was largely 
successful. See The Brady Plan, EMTA, http://www.emta.org/template.aspx?id=35&term
s=brady+plan (last visited Feb. 12, 2015). 
81 IMF, supra note 19, at 38-39. 
82 Id. 
83 Buchheit, supra note 16, at 878. This affidavit was a key element of Peru’s case. See 
id. 
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The Belgian Court of Appeals accepted this interpretation of pari 
passu and held that a sovereign debtor cannot make payments to one 
creditor to the exclusion of other creditors.84 The Belgian Court’s 
decision prevented Peru from paying the holders of its restructured debt, 
and Peru subsequently settled with Elliott.85 
2. After Peru 
It is important to note that after the Belgian Court’s decision in the 
Peru case, the language of the pari passu clause in sovereign debt 
contracts did not change.86 In an attempt to understand this lack of 
market response, Choi and Gulati conducted “over fifty in-depth 
interviews with market participants” to try and discern the reason for this 
lack of response.87 The most meaningful reason that Choi and Gulati 
could identify was “that it was impossible for standard-form clauses that 
were present in every single sovereign debt instrument across the globe 
to change every time there was an aberrant court decision.”88 
Instead of focusing on contractual language, the market did 
eventually produce a coordinated response to Peru in a different form.89 
In 2003, the sovereign debt community organized itself around a general 
litigation strategy and attempted to protect the “ranking” interpretation of 
the pari passu clause when the issue surfaced in U.S. courts.90 The 
contested interpretation of the pari passu clause appeared in a New York 
court in a case regarding the restructuring of Argentina’s sovereign 
debt.91 
3. Argentina V. NML 
In 2001, Argentina defaulted on its Fiscal Agency Agreement Bonds 
(“FAA Bonds”),92 which were originally issued in 1994, and “declared a 
                                                                                                             
84 See Varottil, supra note 23, at 121-22. 
85 Id. at 122. 
86 See Choi, supra note 17, at 1137. 
87 Id. at 1136-37. 
88 Id. at 1137-38. 
89 See id. at 1138. 
90 See id. 
91 Id. 
92 These FAA Bonds were Brady Bonds. A fiscal agency agreement operates where a 
fiscal agent acts as a trustee for bondholders to receive funds from the debtor and make 
payments of interest and principal accordingly. “The Agreement further obligates the 
fiscal agent to give notice to bondholders . . . [i]f the debtor fails to deposit sufficient 
funds to pay the interest due[,] if a bondholder claims that an ‘event of default’ or 
‘default’ occurred[,] or if the bonds have ever been accelerated.” Rory Macmillan, The 
Next Sovereign Debt Crisis, 31 Stan. J. Int’l L. 305, 341-42 (1995). 
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‘temporary moratorium’ on principal and interest payments . . . .”93 
These bonds contained what the court called an “Equal Treatment 
Provision”—namely, the pari passu clause.94 Following its default, in 
2005, Argentina offered to exchange the FAA Bonds for new bonds with 
different terms.95 Subsequently, Argentina renewed the moratorium, 
which halted all payments on the FAA Bonds.96 In 2010, Argentina again 
renewed its offer to exchange the bonds.97 
The plaintiffs in the case, NML Capital, owned defaulted FAA 
bonds.98 NML sued Argentina, alleging breach of contract under the pari 
passu clause, and sought injunctive relief for specific performance of the 
Equal Treatment Provision.99 “In February 2012, the district court 
granted injunctive relief, ordering Argentina to specifically perform its 
obligations under the Equal Treatment Provision . . . .”100 On appeal, in 
October 2012, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision 
granting summary judgment to NML Capital on their claim for breach of 
the pari passu clause, and ordered Argentina to make “ratable payments” 
to all holders of its debt.101 Yet, the Second Circuit stayed the injunctive 
relief until the Supreme Court heard Argentina’s appeal.102 In June 2014, 
the Supreme Court refused to hear Argentina’s appeal, and the Second 
Circuit lifted the prior stay on the injunctions.103 Thus, Argentina found 
itself unable to pay its creditors holding restructured bonds without 
paying its holdout investors in full under the Second Circuit’s ratable 
payment order.104 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision, Argentina failed to make a 
$539 million payment that was due on its debts by July 2014.105 This 
move led ratings-agency-Fitch to declare Argentina’s sovereign debt in 
“restricted default.”106 
                                                                                                             
93 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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Effectively, the collective decisions of the U.S. courts gave a hedge 
fund the power to force a sovereign nation to default on its debts—a 
power that was actually used. Accordingly, there is no longer any 
incentive for creditors, in future sovereign debt out-of-court workouts, to 
accept reduced terms when they have the legal means to insist on 
payment in full.107 
4. After Argentina 
In response to the Second Circuit’s and Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Argentina v. NML, there has been a sudden urgency for contract reform 
in the area of sovereign debt.108 “On August 29, 2014, the International 
Capital Market Association (ICMA) released a new set of model clauses 
for sovereign bond contracts to address some of these flaws.”109 ICMA 
has proposed clarifying and standardizing the pari passu clause to 
prevent courts from ordering debtors to pay holdout investors whenever 
the debtors are paying holders of restructured debt.110 
In addition, the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) has published 
a policy paper examining potential areas of reform in the contractual 
framework of sovereign bonds, which particularly addresses the need to 
modify the pari passu clause.111 The IMF has explained that the new 
model clauses “make explicit that, while it requires equal ranking of all 
unsubordinated external indebtedness, it does not require that such 
indebtedness be paid on an equal or ratable basis.”112 
Changes to the boilerplate terms in sovereign debt contracts have not 
been limited to theoretical discussions alone.113 Peru, Mexico, 
Kazakhstan, and Vietnam have all filed registration statements with the 
                                                                                                             
formal winding-up procedure, and which has not otherwise ceased operating.” Definitions 
of Ratings and Other Forms of Opinion, FITCH RATINGS (Dec. 2014), https://www.fitchrat
ings.com/web_content/ratings/fitch_ratings_definitions_and_scales.pdf, at 34. 
107 Roubini, supra note 5. 
108 See, e.g., Roubini, supra note 5; see also Gelpern, supra note 35; see also IMF, 
supra note 19; see also Anna Gelpern, ICMA CACs v. 2.0: Mexico Moves in New York, 
CREDIT SLIPS (Nov. 10, 2014, 11:51 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2014/11/i
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Boilerplate, CREDIT SLIPS (Nov. 18, 2014, 11:13 AM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditsl
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[hereinafter Gelpern, ICMA CACs]. 
109 Gelpern, supra note 35. 
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111 See IMF, supra note 19, at 4. 
112 Id. at 15. 
113 See, e.g., Gelpern, CACs v. 2.0, supra note 108; see also Gelpern, ICMA CACs, 
supra note 108. 
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SEC that reflect the proposed terms of the ICMA model clauses.114 Take 
for example Mexico’s new pari passu clause: 
The debt securities rank and will rank without any 
preference among themselves and equally with all other 
unsubordinated public external indebtedness of Mexico. 
It is understood that this provision shall not be construed 
so as to require Mexico to make payments under the debt 
securities ratably with payments being made under any 
other public external indebtedness.115 
A notable feature of many of these clauses is that they no longer 
include the Latin term pari passu and that they explicitly disavow the 
ratable payment construction.116 Although they are modeled on the 
ICMA model clauses, the new pari passu clauses seem to exclude 
payment in slightly different ways.117 For example, Kazakhstan’s new 
pari passu clause is phrased as follows: 
The Notes will at all times rank pari passu without 
preference among themselves and at least pari passu in 
right of payment, with all other unsecured External 
Indebtedness of the Issuer from time to time outstanding, 
provided, however, that the Issuer shall have no 
obligation to effect equal or rateable payment(s) at any 
time with respect to the Notes or any other External 
Indebtedness and, in particular, shall have no obligation 
to pay other External Indebtedness at the same time or as 
a condition of paying sums due on the Notes and vice 
versa.118 
And Vietnam’s new pari passu clause is phrased as follows: 
The Notes shall at all times rank without any preference 
among themselves and equally with all other present and 
future unsecured and unsubordinated External 
Indebtedness (subject to Condition 11 below [Negative 
Pledge]) provided, however, consistent with similar 
provisions in the Government’s other External 
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Indebtedness, that this provision shall not be construed 
so as to oblige the Government to effect equal or 
rateable payment(s) at any time with respect to any such 
other External Indebtedness and, in particular, it shall 
not be construed so as to oblige the Government to pay 
other External Indebtedness at the same time or as a 
condition of paying sums due on the Notes and vice 
versa.119 
Compared to the new pari passu clauses of Kazakhstan and Vietnam, 
Mexico’s new provision clearly and succinctly states the intended 
purpose of the contract’s clause, therefore, ensuring that a future court 
will not require payment on a ratable basis—an objective that all three 
clauses aim to achieve. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Question 
Professors Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati explain that boilerplate 
clauses in sovereign debt contracts do not change until they receive an 
“interpretive shock.”120 However, as demonstrated by the cases of Peru 
and Argentina, the coordinated market response may take different 
forms.121 Following Peru, the market reacted with a coordinated 
litigation strategy.122 Following Argentina, the market reacted swiftly by 
modifying and adopting new formations of the pari passu clause.123 
After Peru, Choi and Gulati’s research revealed that boilerplate 
clauses do not change “every time there was an aberrant court 
decision.”124 Peru and Argentina are very similar decisions, but each case 
produced a very different reaction.125 Why then did the response to the 
“interpretive shock” after Peru manifest itself as a litigation strategy as 
opposed to a contractual drafting strategy? 
Furthermore, Choi and Gulati’s research has shown that after an 
“interpretive shock,” most countries will not initially change their 
boilerplate language.126 Any change will usually be preceded by a 
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120 See Choi, supra note 10, at 937. 
121 Choi, supra note 17, at 1139. 
122 Id. at 1138. 
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substantial time lag.127 It took nearly three years before Mexico altered 
its UACs to reflect the meaning applied by Ecuador.128 In Peru, the 
market only reacted with its litigation strategy when the contested 
interpretation of the pari passu clause made an appearance in New York 
courts.129 Why then did modifications to the pari passu clause appear so 
rapidly following Argentina v. NML?130 Why was there no waiting period 
before new contractual clauses were drafted? 
B. Answer 
In order to understand the reason for the speed of the market 
response after Argentina, we must first understand the reason for the lack 
of severity in the market response following Peru. Why was a litigation 
strategy seen as a better option than modifying the boilerplate clauses? 
Explanations of the coordinated market response following Peru can be 
divided in to two groups—endogenous reasons and exogenous 
reasons.131 
Endogenous reasons look inward, to the nature of the boilerplate 
contract itself.132 Boilerplate contracts are inherently “sticky” in order to 
lower transaction costs to market participants.133 Change occurs when the 
“interpretive shock” itself becomes too costly for market participants.134 
After Peru, many market participants believed that the Belgian Court’s 
decision was a one-time occurrence.135 They doubted that a New York 
court would accept a similar interpretation.136 Additionally, a change to 
contractual terms would be helpful for new contracts, but it would not 
address the preexisting debt with doubtful pari passu language.137 The 
costs involved in reworking the pari passu clause would entail the costs 
of mass coordination as well as the uncertainty involved with using a 
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129 See Choi, supra note 17, at 1138. 
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non-standard term.138 Therefore, a coordinated litigation strategy was 
seen as the most effective way to protect the interpretation of pari passu 
clauses—both old and new.139 
Exogenous reasons look to outside factors that, while operating 
simultaneously, may mitigate the need for change.140 Around the same 
time as Peru, the market saw a shift from UACs, which required 
unanimous bondholder approval to make modifications to repayment 
terms, to CACs, which only required a majority (or sometimes 
supermajority) of bondholders to agree to modifications.141 This change 
gave increased power to sovereign debtors and decreased the power of 
holdout creditors.142 Thus, there was less perceived need to further 
decrease the power of holdout creditors.143 Also, the 2001 Argentinean 
debt default occurred shortly after the Peru decision.144 This presented 
the perfect opportunity for market participants to merely continue the 
litigation process. 
However, Argentina differs from Peru in one key way—besides 
giving a holdout investor a “weapon” to use, a holdout investor has 
actually used said weapon.145 This case gave private creditors a weapon 
with which they could enjoin a sovereign debtor’s repayment to any 
other creditor holding debt of the same legal priority.146 This weapon was 
then used by NML against Argentina when the fund forced the nation 
into default.147 These cases are no longer instances of a vulture fund 
waving a metaphorical gun; following Argentina, NML actually fired the 
weapon. 
Although the Belgian Court decision in Peru was also seen as 
placing a weapon in the hands of holdout investors, the potential weapon 
was never used, as the parties reached a settlement.148 Thus, the Peru 
decision raised awareness to the risks associated with the pari passu 
clause, but it left no major impact.149 Only after a holdout investor 
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exercised its power over a sovereign nation, did the need for rapid 
change become so clear.150 
Now, unlike Peru, the cost of leaving the pari passu clause as is 
exceeds the costs of adopting the modified clauses. The “interpretive 
shock” of a court giving a private investor the means to force a sovereign 
nation into default, and the investor actually exercising said power, has 
become too costly for market participants.151 Furthermore, the Belgian 
Court’s decision is no longer an “aberration” and a one-time 
occurrence.152 The formulation of the original pari passu clause has 
repeatedly been shown to be flawed, and there is no longer any reason to 
try and protect contracts with those clauses. 
The exogenous reasons surrounding the Peru litigation are no longer 
present after Argentina. Sovereign nations are now more exposed than 
ever to the power wielded by holdout investors. There is no longer any 
doubt surrounding the meaning of, and the costs associated with, the 
boilerplate formulation of the old pari passu clause. Therefore, there are 
few risks borne by adopting the modified pari passu clause, and there is a 
sudden rush for market participants to get themselves out of their 
precarious situations. 
C. What to Expect Next 
1. Further Litigation of the Pari Passu Clause 
Despite the power afforded to holdout investors in Argentina, 
litigation of the pari passu clause is not complete.153 To fully appreciate 
the scope of the Argentina decision, it is necessary to examine the 
Second Circuit’s decision is greater detail. The pari passu clause in 
Argentina’s FAA Bonds was phrased as follows: 
[t]he Securities will constitute . . . direct, unconditional, 
unsecured and unsubordinated obligations of the 
Republic and shall at all times rank pari passu without 
any preference among themselves. The payment 
obligations of the Republic under the Securities shall at 
all times rank at least equally with all its other present 
and future unsecured and unsubordinated External 
Indebtedness . . . .154 
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The Second Circuit concluded that those two sentences of the pari 
passu clause created two separate obligations.155 “The first sentence . . . 
prohibits Argentina, as bond issuer, from formally subordinating the 
bonds by issuing superior debt.”156 In addition, “[t]he second 
sentence . . . prohibits Argentina, as bond payor, from paying on other 
bonds without paying on the FAA Bonds.”157 
The decision of the Second Circuit adopted the “ratable payment” 
interpretation introduced by the Lowenfeld affidavit in Peru.158 Still, the 
court’s decision may be somewhat narrow in scope.159 The Second 
Circuit merely affirmed the district court’s decision that Argentina 
breached its contract with bondholders by its “course of conduct” and 
“extraordinary behavior.”160 Future litigation will be needed to determine 
the meaning of “course of conduct” and the “behavior” necessary to 
constitute a breach of contract.161 
Nevertheless, the Argentina decision was still sufficient to initiate 
the rapid change seen in sovereign debt contracts. “[M]ost international 
sovereign bonds issued after 2000 have pari passu clauses that include 
language that is functionally similar to that in the relevant Argentine 
bonds.”162 Even though future cases will likely determine the breadth of 
the “course of conduct” necessary to breach the pari passu clause, “this is 
the first instance in which a district court order triggered a sovereign 
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default by barring a sovereign from paying on debt obligations . . . it was 
willing and financially able to meet.”163 Now, other sovereigns have 
witnessed a nation default on debt that is functionally equivalent to their 
own. That default is likely the reason why the new ICMA model contract 
clauses have been adopted so quickly. 
2. Pari Passu as a Matter of English Law 
Both Peru and Argentina dealt with the pari passu clause as a matter 
of New York law.164 Yet, a large percentage of outstanding sovereign 
bonds are governed subject to English law.165 Still, “[t]here is no clear 
English judicial precedent on the interpretation of the pari passu 
clause.”166 
In 2005, the Financial Markets Law Committee (“FMLC”) published 
a report, which concluded that the pari passu clause would follow the 
“ranking” interpretation as a matter of English law and not the “ratable” 
interpretation.167 “It is . . . strongly asserted that the [ratable] payment 
interpretation of the pari passu clause is unsupportable as a matter of 
English law except where the clause is very clearly drafted to achieve 
this effect.”168 Following the decisions of the Second Circuit and the 
Supreme Court in Argentina, the FMLC reiterated its position that 
“English Courts would . . . likely take a different approach . . . and in 
particular would likely regard the remedy of specific performance as 
unsuitable.”169 
                                                                                                             
163 Marco E. Schnabl & Jordan C. Wall, A Question of Behavior: Foreign Sovereign 
Debt Restucturing Before US Courts, SKADDEN, ARPS, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Jan. 
2015), http://www.skadden.com/insights/question-behavior-foreign-sovereign-debt-restru
cturing-us-courts. 
164 See Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363 (1999); see NML 
Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2012). 
165 IMF, supra note 19, at 13 (“[S]overeign bonds governed by English law represent 
approximately 40 percent of the outstanding stock in notional value.”). 
166 Id. 
167 Id.; see also FMLC, supra note 74, at 22. 
168 FMLC, supra note 74, at 22. The FMLC provided three reasons for its assessment 
that English Law would differ from New York law in regards to the pari passu clause. 
See id. at 2. First, the “ratable” interpretation would offend the “business commonsense” 
principle used by English courts when construing a contract. Id. Second, based on the 
principles of English rules of contract construction, words should be given their “ordinary 
and natural meaning.” Id. The most literal interpretation requires a “rank” of claims, and 
does not require pari passu “payment.” Third, analysis of English case law provides 
persuasive authority against the “ratable” interpretation. Id. 
169 Role, Use and Meaning of Pari Passu Clauses in Sovereign Debt Obligations as a 
Matter of English Law, FMLC http://www.fmlc.org/uploads/2/6/5/8/26584807/fmlc_me
morandum_on_pari_passu_clauses.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2015, 4:00 PM). 
196 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:175 
 
Should the contested interpretation of the pari passu clause appear in 
English courts, the FMLC report should prove to be very persuasive by 
serving a similar purpose as the Lowenfeld affidavit in Peru. “There is 
almost no risk that English courts, faced with similar facts to NML v 
Argentina, would adopt the ‘payment’ interpretation.”170 Still, it would 
be risky for English contracting parties to continue to use the boilerplate 
pari passu clauses.171 There will always be risk associated with any sort 
of litigation and it is impossible to guarantee that a judge will not follow 
the Argentina decision.172 Also, the process of engaging in such 
litigation, alone, can prove costly and foreign market participants may 
still feel exposed using the original boilerplate clauses.173 
When Choi and Gulati conducted their research on boilerplate 
evolution in sovereign debt contracts, they also studied the impact of an 
“interpretative shock” on English-Law bonds.174 They observed that 
English market participants did react to shocks in the New York market, 
but that the innovation was considerably smaller than what was occurring 
in New York.175 The big change that took place in New York was the 
shift from UACs to CACs; but, “the English market was already using 
CACs when the New York market shocks occurred.”176 Therefore, it is 
not entirely clear how the English market should react when the 
boilerplate clauses, that received the interpretive shock, differ very little 
between English and New York law.177 
Although it has been widely accepted that an English court would 
not accept the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the pari passu clause in 
Argentina, it would not be surprising if the English market modified its 
boilerplate pari passu clauses as well. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that 
new sovereign bonds will increasingly adopt English law in their choice 
of law provisions instead of New York law. The new modifications to 
the pari passu clause subject to New York law make explicit the 
intentions of the contracting parties to adopt the “ranking” interpretation; 
and therefore, the reasons for changing the governing law provisions to a 
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more favorable jurisdiction are obviated.178 The main reason for a 
foreign-law choice of law provision in a sovereign debt contract is to 
prevent the issuer from changing its domestic laws in order to get out of 
an unfavorable provision in the contract.179 
Furthermore, there are other reasons why parties choose New York 
law.180 “New York has a well-developed body of commercial law[,] . . .  
its courts are considered both impartial and experienced in resolving 
disputes[,] . . . and . . . many of the lenders to foreign sovereign debtors 
are based in New York.”181 Therefore, sovereign bonds issued subject to 
English law may change to reflect the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Argentina, but it is unlikely that there will be an increase in sovereign 
bonds issued subject to English law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
When new boilerplate clauses are adopted in sovereign debt 
contracts, smaller market participants are first to adopt the changes.182 
Larger market participants will only shift when it is evident that a new 
standard is clearly underway.183 Peru, Mexico, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam 
have already issued new debt using ICMA’s model clauses.184 However, 
unlike historical changes to boilerplate contracts, it has not been 
individual countries that are innovating the new clauses.185 ICMA and 
the IMF, both undoubtedly large market participants, have modified the 
pari passu clauses.186 
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The Second Circuit decision in Argentina v. NML and the subsequent 
debt default by Argentina is arguably the strongest “interpretive shock” 
that the pari passu clause has ever received. The pari passu clause has 
suddenly become a “weapon” that holdout investors are willing to use. 
Unlike Peru, it would make little sense for market participants to 
continue their coordinated litigation strategy. The pari passu clause has 
been demonstrated to be dangerous and it presents an immediate threat to 
insolvent sovereign nations. No reasons exist, either endogenous or 
exogenous, to have a long waiting period until large-scale adoption of the 
new pari passu clauses. Change is clearly underway, and it can be 
expected to see further large-scale market adoption of the reformulated 
pari passu clauses in sovereign debt contracts. 
